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Abstract
We consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations. Private information that agents 
have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price. We study the learning externalities 
that arise in this setting, and in particular their implications for price informativeness and welfare. When 
private signals are noisy, so that agents rely more on the information conveyed by prices, discouraging 
information gathering may be Pareto improving. Complementarities in information acquisition can lead to 
multiple equilibria.
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We study the market for a risky asset for which agents have interdependent private valuations. 
Heterogeneous valuations may arise for various reasons. For example, agents may differ with 
respect to the uses they have for the asset, their liquidity needs, their investment opportunities, or 
the regulatory constraints they face. Diversity in valuations can be thought of as an indirect way 
to capture idiosyncratic preference or endowment shocks.1 It can also be interpreted in purely 
behavioral terms – for example, agents could “agree to disagree” about the distribution of the 
asset payoff, or a subset of traders could be subject to psychological biases or misperceptions. 
Each trader is uncertain about his own valuation, and has the opportunity to acquire private 
information about it prior to trade. Equilibrium prices reflect some of this information.
We use a standard competitive rational expectations setup, with Gaussian shocks and con-
stant absolute risk aversion, that nests the classical models of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and 
Hellwig (1980). Essentially the only difference with respect to the classical framework is that 
we allow agents’ valuations to be imperfectly correlated. This gives us a tractable model of 
partial revelation without resorting to exogenous noise trade, with a unique linear equilibrium 
price function for any allocation of private information. The model highlights the role played by 
learning externalities in determining the information content of prices and the welfare of market 
participants.
To exposit our main results, it suffices to consider a symmetric version of our model. There are 
several types of agents distinguished by their valuations. Agents of type i have valuation θi and a 
proportion λi of these agents acquires private information about θi . The equilibrium price takes 
a very simple form: it is proportional to 
∑
i λiθi . Since agents differ in their valuations, they also 
differ in the information that they extract from prices. In particular, type i agents make inferences 
about θi , inferences that are necessarily imperfect due to the dependence of the equilibrium price 
on the valuations of other types.
Complementarities in information acquisition, that give agents a greater incentive to gather 
information when others do so, arise naturally in this setting. To understand how, suppose that 
there are only two types, and the proportions of informed agents, λ1 and λ2, are exogenously 
given. Let ρ be the correlation coefficient between θ1 and θ2, |ρ| < 1. The equilibrium price 
is proportional to λ1θ1 + λ2θ2. Price informativeness for type 1 is decreasing in λ2, as long as 
λ2 ≤ λ1. This is true regardless of the value of ρ, though it is easiest to see when ρ = 0 as in that 
case the valuation of type 2 appears as “pure noise” in the price function from the perspective of 
type 1. This is an across-type complementarity wherein agents of a given type learn less from the 
price if more agents of another type acquire information.
Now observe that, as long as ρ = 0 and λ2 > 0, the price conveys some information to type 1 
agents about their valuation θ1 even if none of them acquires information about it (λ1 = 0). If 
ρ < 0, price informativeness for type 1 is in fact decreasing in λ1, for λ1 < |ρ|λ2. In this interval, 
as more agents of type 1 acquire information, the price becomes an increasingly mixed signal 
about θ1; for example, a high price can result from a high θ1 (“good news” for type 1) or from 
a high θ2 (“bad news” for type 1). Thus, if ρ < 0, a within-type complementarity can arise, 
wherein price informativeness for a given type is lower when more agents of that type acquire 
information.
1 These shocks may depend, for example, on group affiliations or on the geographic location of traders. See Rostek 
and Weretka (2012) for further discussion and interpretation.
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types. Agents of type i can choose to pay a cost ci to acquire a private signal about their valu-
ation θi . We characterize the equilibrium allocation of private information, i.e. the equilibrium 
value of λi for each type i. Naturally, the λi ’s depend on the ci ’s as well as on the correlation 
of valuations across types. Given the learning externalities discussed above, we do not expect 
information gathering to be efficient, however.
The welfare analysis is complicated by the fact that price informativeness is a multidimen-
sional object in an economy with heterogenous valuations and, moreover, there is no unambigu-
ous link between price informativeness for a given type and the welfare of that type. Agents can 
make better portfolio decisions if prices are more informative about their valuation. But more in-
formative prices are also closer to their true valuation, reducing profitable trading opportunities. 
We find that increasing the cost of information acquisition for agents of the highest cost type 
leads to a reduction in the proportion of these agents who acquire information, lowering price 
informativeness for them and improving their welfare. Price informativeness for other types is 
higher, on the other hand, while the effect on their welfare depends on how precise their private 
information is. When their private signals are noisy, so that they have more to gain from learning 
from prices, they are better off. This is the case in which discouraging information acquisition 
by the highest cost type makes all types better off. Notice that it is precisely when prices have 
an important role to play in aggregating and transmitting private information that curtailing the 
collection of private information (by a subset of agents) is Pareto improving. A more general 
takeaway is that private information collection can impact different groups of agents differently, 
both in terms of the information conveyed by prices and welfare.
Across-type complementarities, wherein information gathering by one type interferes with 
learning from prices by other types, are an important ingredient of our welfare result. Within-type 
complementarities play no role here, but are crucial when we consider equilibrium multiplicity. 
It can turn out that there is an equilibrium in which no agent of type i (for some i) acquires 
information and another equilibrium in which all of these agents do. In fact, in the equilibrium 
in which no type i agent is informed, prices are more informative for all types, including type i. 
Both across-type and within-type complementarities are at play here.
1.1. Related literature
Vives (2014) studies a competitive rational expectations equilibrium model with private val-
uations. As in our paper, there is no equilibrium with a high correlation of types, and when an 
equilibrium does exist the price function is partially revealing. However, price informativeness 
does not depend on the mass of informed agents (as long as this mass is positive) – the price 
reveals the average type of all agents regardless of how many are informed. This in turn implies 
that the information acquisition decisions of agents are independent.
Our stochastic environment shares some features with that of Rostek and Weretka (2012, 
2015), insofar as they allow heterogeneity in the correlations between the private valuations 
of traders. They impose an “equicommonality” assumption, namely that the average correlation 
between the valuation of a trader and those of the remaining traders is the same for all traders. We 
do not impose any restriction on the correlation structure for our results on the characterization of 
equilibrium and price informativeness with exogenous private information (though we do impose 
symmetry in our analysis of information acquisition). The aims of the Rostek–Weretka papers 
are different from ours – they study the effect of an exogenous increase in the number of traders 
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market power.
Our framework generalizes the models of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980), 
as well as several later extensions of these models. We go beyond this literature in looking at 
information acquisition by different groups of traders, and analyzing the learning externalities 
that arise both within and across groups.
While the social value of a public signal in a symmetric information economy has been the 
subject of a voluminous literature going back to Hirshleifer (1971) (see Gottardi and Rahi, 2014
and the references cited therein), not much research has been done on the welfare properties of 
private information production when prices reflect some of this information. In particular, the 
literature gives little guidance on the circumstances in which policies that affect private infor-
mation collection can improve market outcomes in a rational expectations economy. In Vives 
(2014), information acquisition is socially efficient provided the marginal cost of information is 
sufficiently low. This efficiency result is not surprising given that there are no learning externali-
ties in this model. Allen (1984) shows that imposing a tax on information gathering in a variant of 
the Grossman–Stiglitz model can make all agents better off. But the welfare analysis is compro-
mised by the presence of noise traders.2 In fact, most of the rational expectations literature relies 
on exogenous noise trade and hence does not provide a suitable framework for welfare analysis. 
Usually a proxy for welfare is employed, such as price informativeness, price volatility or some 
measure of liquidity. There are a few papers that feature fully optimizing traders but, with the 
exception of Vives (2014) cited above, they do not address the question of the optimality of the 
equilibrium allocation of private information.
There is a large literature on complementarities in information gathering. The closest to the 
present paper are competitive models in which these complementarities arise because prices 
become less informative as more agents acquire information.3 Stein (1987) provides an early 
example of the entry of informed speculators reducing price informativeness for existing traders, 
in a setting where agents seek to forecast shocks to the supply of the underlying in a futures 
market. In an environment closer to that of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), but with different 
assumptions on preferences and distributions, Barlevy and Veronesi (2008) find that a comple-
mentarity can arise because the asset payoff and noise trader demand are negatively correlated. 
Their mechanism has a similar flavor to our within-type complementarity which is due to a neg-
ative correlation between the valuations of traders from different groups. Price informativeness 
can be decreasing in the incidence of informed trading in Ganguli and Yang (2009) and Man-
zano and Vives (2011) because agents have access to two sources of information (about the asset 
payoff and the asset supply), in Goldstein et al. (2014) because agents with different trading 
opportunities in segmented markets may trade on the same information in opposite directions, 
2 While the liquidity traders in Allen (1984) do have a utility function, it is contrived to generate exogenous noise trade 
exactly as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
3 Other mechanisms have also been explored in the literature. Complementarities in information acquisition arise in 
Goldstein and Yang (2015) because agents collect different pieces of information about the asset value (as more agents 
of one group acquire information, the uncertainty about the asset payoff is reduced for the other group, increasing the 
return from gathering information for them), in Mele and Sangiorgi (2015) because of Knightian uncertainty (as prices 
become more informative, uninformed agents have a greater incentive to acquire information to resolve the ambiguity 
and thus “decode” the information contained in prices), in García and Strobl (2011) due to relative wealth concerns (as 
the proportion of informed agents rises, so does the average wealth of all agents, giving the uninformed an additional 
incentive to gather information), and in Veldkamp (2006a,b) because of increasing returns to scale in the supply of 
information (information gets cheaper as more agents acquire information).
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admits a more pronounced multiplicity of equilibria, including equilibria in which agents who 
collect information have a higher cost of information acquisition than those who do not, in an 
otherwise symmetric economy.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the economy in Section 2. In Sections 3–5 we 
take the information acquisition decisions of agents as given. We characterize the unique linear 
equilibrium price function in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we provide several examples in 
which this characterization can be employed. In Section 5 we analyze the information content of 
the price for each type. We endogenize information acquisition in Section 6, and discuss learning 
externalities within and across types. Section 7 is devoted to welfare and Section 8 to equilibrium 
multiplicity. Section 9 concludes. Most of the proofs are in the appendices.
2. The economy
There is a single risky asset in zero net supply, and a riskfree asset with the interest rate 
normalized to zero. There are N types of agents, N ≥ 2, and a continuum of agents of each 
type. Formally, we index agents of any given type by the unit interval, endowed with Lebesgue 
measure. The private valuation for the risky asset of an agent of type i is given by vi = θi + ηi . 
Prior to trade, type i agents can acquire a private signal about θi by incurring a cost ci ; for agent 
n of type i (agent in for short) this signal takes the form sin = θi + in. In other words, type i
agents are distinguished by their valuation vi , and θi is the part of vi about which they can gather 
information at some cost; their signals can have some idiosyncratic variation, however.
The random variables {θi, ηi, {in}n∈[0,1]}i=1,...,N are joint normal with mean zero. Let θ :=
(θi)
N
i=1 and η := (ηi)Ni=1. For each type i, the valuation shock ηi is independent of θ (but may 
be correlated with ηj , j = i), the signal shock in is independent of (θ, η), and the signal shocks 
across agents, {in}n∈[0,1], are i.i.d. We adopt the convention that the average of a continuum 
of i.i.d. random variables with mean zero is zero. Then, the average signal of agents of type i, ∫
n
sindn, is equal to θi .4 To ensure that the problem is nontrivial, we assume that the covariance 
matrix of θ is positive definite.5
If agent in buys qin units of the risky asset at price p, his “wealth” is Win = (vi − p)qin. 
Given his information set Iin, which consists of all the random variables that he observes prior 
to trade, he solves maxqin E[− exp(−riWin)|Iin]. Agents have rational expectations – they know 
the price function, a function of the private signals of all agents in the economy, also denoted by 
p, and condition on the price when making their portfolio decisions. Thus Iin = {sin, p} if agent 
in is informed, and Iin = {p} if he is uninformed.
We denote the proportion of agents of type i who choose to become informed by λi ∈ [0, 1]. 
An equilibrium consists of a vector λ := (λi)Ni=1, and a price function p, such that agents opti-
mize and markets clear. Agent optimization requires that each agent is happy with his information 
acquisition decision (to acquire private information or not) given the price function p, and subse-
quently, for any realization of p, he chooses an optimal portfolio given his information. Letting 
qi :=
∫
n
qindn, the aggregate trade of type i, the market-clearing condition is 
∑
i qi = 0.
4 See the technical appendix of Vives (2008) for a discussion of the use of the strong law of large numbers in this 
context. For ease of exposition, we drop the qualifier “almost surely”.
5 Note that agent valuations cannot in general be written as the sum of a common value component and an idiosyn-
cratic private value component. Indeed, if vi = v + ui , where Cov(v, ui) = 0 and Cov(ui , uj ) = 0 for all i, j , then 
Cov(vi , vj ) = Var(v), which is positive and the same for all i, j .
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3. The equilibrium price function
In this section we solve for a rational expectations equilibrium price function for given λ. We 
conjecture a linear price function of the form
p =
N∑
i=1
aiθi, (1)
for some coefficients (a1, . . . , aN), not all zero. Thus the private signals of type i agents are re-
flected in the price only through their average signal, which is equal to θi . Given the linear-normal 
structure of the model, agents have a mean-variance objective function. The optimal portfolio of 
agent in is:
qin = E(vi |Iin) − p
riVar(vi |Iin) . (2)
To calculate agents’ portfolios, we use the standard projection theorem for normals.6 Let 
βi := σθip/σ 2p . Then
σ 2θi |p = σ 2θi − βiσθip. (3)
We proceed under the provisional assumption that p does not (fully) reveal θi for any i, i.e. 
σ 2θi |p > 0. We will show later, in the proof of Proposition 3.2, that this assumption is in fact 
satisfied at any equilibrium. We use the superscripts I and U to distinguish between the portfolios 
of informed and uninformed agents.
Lemma 3.1 (Optimal portfolios). Suppose σ 2i and σ 2ηi are not both zero, and σ 2θi |p > 0. Then the 
optimal portfolios of type i agents are given by
qIin =
1
ri
· σ
2
θi |psin −
[
σ 2θi |p + (1 − βi)σ 2i
]
p
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )σ 2ηi + σ 2θi |pσ 2i
,
qUin = −
1
ri
· 1 − βi
σ 2θi |p + σ 2ηi
p.
From Lemma 3.1, the aggregate trade of type i agents is
qi = λi
ri
· σ
2
θi |pθi −
[
σ 2θi |p + (1 − βi)σ 2i
]
p
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )σ 2ηi + σ 2θi |pσ 2i
− 1 − λi
ri
· 1 − βi
σ 2θi |p + σ 2ηi
p, (4)
6 Consider random vectors x1 and x2, (x1, x2) ∼ N(μ, ), and partition μ and  as follows:
μ :=
(
μ1
μ2
)
,  :=
(
11 12
21 22
)
,
where μi := E(xi ) and ij := Cov(xi , xj ), i, j = 1, 2. If 22 is nonsingular, we have
(x1|x2) ∼ N
(
μ1 +12−122 (x2 − μ2),11 −12−122 21
)
.
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condition, 
∑
i qi = 0. Before proceeding with this task, we impose some further assumptions 
which will stay in force for the remainder of the paper:
A1. λk > 0 and λ	 > 0 for at least two types k and 	.
A2. The equilibrium trade of agent in is measurable with respect to his information Iin.
A3. For any type i, one of the following information structures applies:
(a) Asymmetric information: σ 2i = 0 and σ 2ηi > 0; or
(b) Differential information: σ 2i > 0 and σ 2ηi = 0.
Assumption A1 is only provisional – we endogenize λ in Section 6 where we show that, in any 
equilibrium, λi is indeed positive for at least two types (see Lemma 6.3). Assumption A2 rules 
out some trivial equilibria. Assumption A3 is for tractability, and gives us two canonical informa-
tion structures that have been employed in the literature. Under information structure (a), type i
is asymmetrically informed in the sense that the informed agents of type i know θi while the 
uninformed of that type do not. Under information structure (b), type i is differentially informed 
in the sense that the informed agents of type i have conditionally i.i.d. signals about θi ; more-
over, the restriction σ 2ηi = 0 implies that vi = θi , so that their pooled information reveals their 
type.7 Note that Assumption A3 allows some types to be asymmetrically informed and others to 
be differentially informed.
Proposition 3.2 (Equilibrium price function). There is a unique linear equilibrium price function 
given by
p = k
∑
i
γiθi, k = 0, (5)
where
γi =
{
λi(riσ
2
ηi
)−1 if type i is asymmetrically informed,
λi(riσ
2
i
)−1 if type i is differentially informed.
The price function does not (fully) reveal θi for any i.
From Lemma 3.1, we see that the coefficient on the private signal in the optimal trade of 
an informed agent of type i is (riσ 2ηi )
−1 in the asymmetric information case, and (riσ 2i )
−1 in 
the differential information case. We can think of this as the “trading intensity” of an informed 
agent. Thus the coefficient of θi in the price function is proportional to the trading intensity of the 
informed agents of type i, times their mass λi . The proposition does not require any condition 
on the correlations between the θi’s (other than positive definiteness of the covariance matrix). 
These correlations do affect the value of the constant k in the price function.
It is instructive to compare the revelation properties of our price function with that of Vives 
(2014). Vives assumes that there is a continuum of types, with the result that the price reveals 
7 While the terms “asymmetric” and “differential” are a useful way to distinguish between one-sided and multifaceted 
private information, we should point out that our usage is somewhat loose – we say that type i is asymmetrically informed 
even if λi = 1 so that all type i agents know θi , and we refer to a type as differentially informed even though, strictly 
speaking, this label only applies to the informed agents of that type.
R. Rahi, J.-P. Zigrand / Journal of Economic Theory 177 (2018) 558–593 565the average type, which for any trader is a sufficient statistic for the information of all other
traders. Thus every trader effectively has access to the pooled information of all traders in the 
economy (Vives calls this a “privately revealing” equilibrium). In our model, on the other hand, 
there are finitely many types, with a continuum of each type. While the price does not reflect 
any idiosyncratic variation within types, it is affected by idiosyncratic variation across types. An 
agent of type i, who seeks to learn θi , knows θi in equilibrium only if his private signal already 
tells him what θi is. If he does not observe θi directly, how much he learns from the price depends 
on the mass of informed agents of every type. Price informativeness in Vives’ model is the same 
regardless of the mass of informed agents (as long as this mass is positive).
4. Examples
In this section we provide a number of examples of our general framework. They include 
the economy in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) with noisy aggregate supply, and the competitive 
limit of the economy in Hellwig (1980) with noise traders. In both cases, the noise is easily 
endogenized as optimizing trade arising from liquidity or hedging considerations. It can also 
be interpreted in purely behavioral terms. In these examples, agents have CARA utility and all 
random variables are joint normally distributed with mean zero. In Examples 4.1–4.3, optimal 
portfolios are given by Lemma 3.1 and the equilibrium price function by Proposition 3.2. In 
Example 4.4, Lemma 3.1 does not hold but an agent’s portfolio is linear in the price and his 
private signal (if he is informed), so that the equilibrium price is still a linear combination of the 
θi ’s as in Proposition 3.2.
Example 4.1 (Grossman–Stiglitz). The asset payoff is v = θ + η. There is a unit mass of in-
vestors, of whom a proportion λ ∈ (0, 1) privately observes θ . In addition, there is a unit mass 
of “noise traders” whose private valuation is u + η, of which they privately observe the com-
ponent u. The random variables θ, η, and u are mutually independent. This fits into our model 
with two types, both of which are asymmetrically informed: λ1 = λ, λ2 = 1, θ1 = θ, θ2 = u, 
η1 = η2 = η, and σ 21 = σ 22 = 0. The optimal portfolios are
qI1n =
θ − p
r1σ 2η
, qU1n =
E(v|p) − p
r1Var(v|p) , q
I
2n =
u − p
r2σ 2η
.
The price function is
p = k
[
λ
r1σ 2η
θ + 1
r2σ 2η
u
]
,
which takes the same form as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), with u playing the role of the 
random aggregate supply or noise trade.
Notice that our noise traders do not trade an exogenous amount, as they are typically assumed 
to do in the noisy rational expectations literature. They can be thought of as “sentiment traders”, 
with u being the sentiment shock, as in Mendel and Shleifer (2012) (whose model is a variant 
of the above example), or as investors who trade on noise as though it were information, as in 
Banerjee and Green (2015) and Peress (2014). ‖
Example 4.2 (Grossman–Stiglitz with optimizing liquidity traders). Rather than mimic the stan-
dard assumption of independent noise trade, suppose we replace the type 2 traders in Example 4.1
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like the type 1 traders, but also have an endowment, which is the product of two normal ran-
dom variables, y and e.8 The random variable y is independent of e and η, and is not perfectly 
correlated with θ ; it can be interpreted as the size of the liquidity shock. The covariance σηe is 
nonzero. Each liquidity trader privately observes θ and y prior to trade. His optimal portfolio is 
given by
qI2n =
θ − r2σηey − p
r2σ 2η
. (6)
This fits into our model as in Example 4.1, except that here θ2 = θ − r2σηey.9 The price function 
is
p = k
[
λ
r1σ 2η
θ + 1
r2σ 2η
(θ − r2σηey)
]
= k
σ 2η
[
(λr−11 + r−12 )θ − σηey
]
.
If y is independent of θ , the price function is of the same form as in Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980). ‖
Example 4.3 (Hellwig). The asset payoff is θ . There is a unit mass of differentially informed 
agents who receive conditionally i.i.d. signals about θ . In addition, there is a unit mass of “noise 
traders” who are differentially informed about their private valuation u, which is independent 
of θ . There are no uninformed agents. This is a special case of our general setup with two types, 
both of which are differentially informed: λ1 = λ2 = 1, θ1 = θ, θ2 = u, and σ 2η1 = σ 2η2 = 0. The 
optimal portfolios are:
qI1n =
E(θ |s1n,p) − p
r1Var(θ |s1n,p) , q
I
2n =
E(u|s2n,p) − p
r2Var(u|s2n,p) .
The price function is
p = k
[
1
r1σ 21
θ + 1
r2σ 22
u
]
.
This is essentially the limiting equilibrium in Hellwig (1980), as the number of informed traders 
goes to infinity, with u playing the role of the exogenous noise trade as in Example 4.1.
Just as we replaced the noise traders in Example 4.1 with optimizing liquidity traders in Ex-
ample 4.2, we can do that here as well. The optimal portfolio of type 2 agents is then given 
by (6). We assume that 1n is independent of y. This fits into our general model as follows: 
λ1 = λ2 = 1, η1 = 0, η2 = η, σ 21 = σ 2 , σ 22 = 0, v1 = θ1 = θ , v2 = θ2 +η, and θ2 = θ − r2σηey.10
The price function is
8 A number of papers in the CARA-normal REE literature have used such a specification of the endowment to generate 
a hedging motive for trade. See, for example, Rahi (1996).
9 The models of Ganguli and Yang (2009) and Manzano and Vives (2011) cannot be reduced to such a specification 
since in their setting the coefficient of the hedging term is not exogenous (it depends on the price function).
10 For example, we can think of the asset payoff being θ + η, with type 1 agents having the ability to hedge the risk η.
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[
θ
r1σ 2
+ θ − r2σηey
r2σ 2η
]
= k
[(
1
r1σ 2
+ 1
r2σ 2η
)
θ − σηe
σ 2η
y
]
.
Notice that, unlike the noise traders in the first part of this example, who are differentially in-
formed, all the liquidity traders have the same information. ‖
Thus our model provides a parsimonious framework that nests the classical models of Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980), as well as some extensions of these models that 
have been studied in the literature. The above examples also suggest more general settings that 
have not been considered in the literature and where our analysis is applicable. Example 4.1 can 
easily be extended to multiple categories of “sentiment traders” who may or may not have private 
information about their own sentiment factor ui . Multiple types of fully rational traders whose 
valuations are heterogeneous because of differing liquidity or hedging needs can likewise be con-
sidered along the lines of Example 4.2. A difficulty arises when we allow agents with a hedging 
motive to choose whether or not to acquire information: hedgers, as modeled in Example 4.2, do 
not have a mean-variance objective function if they are uninformed. Our analysis still applies, 
however, as we see in the following example:
Example 4.4 (Multiple hedgers). This example is fully worked out in Appendix B; we provide 
the salient details here.
The asset payoff is v. There are N types of traders with stochastic hedging needs. The wealth 
of agent n of type i is given by
Win = (v − p)qin + yiei,
where yiei is the initial endowment. We assume that (yi)Ni=1 is independent of (ei)
N
i=1 and also of 
v, σvei = 0 for all i, and the covariance matrix of (yi)Ni=1 is positive definite. If agent in chooses 
to acquire information, he observes yi . The proportion of informed agents of type i is λi .
Lemma 3.1 does not hold in this example, so we calculate portfolios from scratch. We con-
jecture that p is a linear combination of the yi’s. If agent in is informed, his optimal portfolio is 
analogous to (6):
qIin =
−riσvei yi − p
riσ 2v
.
Note that E(v|yi, p) = E(v) = 0. Defining the “valuation” of type i agents as θi := σvei yi , 
we can write qIin as a linear combination of θi and p. If agent in is uninformed, his wealth 
is not normally distributed conditional on his information at the time of trade; in particular his 
endowment yiei is not normal. Hence he does not have a mean-variance objective function. 
In Appendix B we show that qUin is a scalar multiple of p (see equation (53)). Thus optimal 
portfolios take the same linear form as in Lemma 3.1, but with different coefficients. Using the 
market-clearing condition 
∑
i[λiqIin + (1 − λi)qUin] = 0, we can calculate the price function. It is 
linear in agent valuations just as in Proposition 3.2, and can be written as
p = k
∑
i
λiθi,
for some nonzero scalar k. ‖
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In this section we study the informativeness of the equilibrium price function for given pro-
portions of informed agents λ (we endogenize λ in the next section). Letting γ := (γi)Ni=1, we 
can write the price function (5) as p = kγ 	θ .11 We denote the covariance matrix of θ by V, 
assumed to be positive definite, and the i’th column of V by Vi . Due to the symmetry of V, the 
i’th row of V is V	i . Then we have
σ 2p = k2γ 	Vγ , and σθip = kV	i γ .
For the uninformed agents of type i, we use the following measure of price informativeness:
Vi :=
σ 2θi − σ 2θi |p
σ 2θi
. (7)
Clearly, Vi ∈ [0, 1). Substituting from (3), we get
Vi =
σ 2θip
σ 2θi σ
2
p
= 1
σ 2θi
· (V
	
i γ )
2
γ 	Vγ
. (8)
If σ 2i > 0, the informed agents of type i also learn from the price. For these agents, the corre-
sponding measure of price informativeness is:
VIi :=
Var(θi |sin) − Var(θi |sin,p)
Var(θi |sin) .
Lemma 5.1. Suppose σ 2i > 0. Then VIi ∈ [0, 1) and is a strictly increasing function of Vi .
In view of this result, we will use Vi as our measure of price informativeness for agents of type i, 
whether or not they observe a noisy private signal in addition to the price. If type i is differentially 
informed, all type i agents make inferences from the price. If type i is asymmetrically informed, 
on the other hand, only the uninformed agents learn from the price; the informed already know θi .
We say that the economy is symmetric if the risk aversion coefficients ri and the shock vari-
ances, σ 2θi , σ
2
ηi
and σ 2i , are the same for all i (in which case, we drop the subscript i on these 
parameters), and all types are either asymmetrically informed or differentially informed. For a 
symmetric economy, γ is proportional to λ by Proposition 3.2. Moreover, the restriction that 
σ 2θi = σ 2θ for all i allows us to characterize Vi in terms of the correlation matrix R := (σ 2θ )−1V, 
with ij ’th element ρij := corr(θi, θj ). Let Ri be the i’th column of R. We write x ∝ y to indicate 
that x and y have the same sign.
Proposition 5.2 (Price informativeness). For a symmetric economy, price informativeness for 
type i is given by
Vi = (R
	
i λ)
2
λ	Rλ
. (9)
Furthermore,
11 All vectors are taken to be column vectors unless transposed.
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∂λi
∝ R	i λ. (10)
Notice that Vi is homogeneous of degree zero in λ: price informativeness depends only on the 
relative proportions of informed agents across types. For type i, we say that there is a within-type 
complementarity if ∂Vi/∂λi < 0, and an across-type complementarity if ∂Vi/∂λj < 0 for some 
j = i. We see from (10) that a necessary condition for within-type complementarity for type i is 
that ρij < 0 for some j .
6. Endogenous information acquisition
So far we have taken the allocation of private information to be exogenous. We now endog-
enize information acquisition. In order to become informed, a type i agent must pay a positive 
cost ci . He takes as given the vector λ and the corresponding price function p = kγ 	θ . We wish 
to find λ such that, for any type, both the informed and uninformed find their decision with regard 
to information acquisition optimal.
It is convenient to use the following monotonic transformation of ex ante expected utility:
Uin :=
(
E[exp(−riWˆin)]
)−2
, (11)
where Wˆin = Win − ci if agent in acquires information, and Wˆin = Win if he does not. Using 
superscripts I and U for informed and uninformed agents respectively, we have
Lemma 6.1 (Utilities). For given λ,
U Iin = e−2rici ·
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )σ 2vi−p
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )σ 2ηi + σ 2θi |pσ 2i
, and UUin =
σ 2vi−p
σ 2θi |p + σ 2ηi
.
Since the utility of an agent depends only on his type, and on whether he is informed or unin-
formed, we shall henceforth drop the subscript n. Thus U Ii will denote the utility of all informed 
agents of type i, and UUi the utility of all uninformed agents of this type. An equilibrium λ is 
characterized by
U Ii
UUi
is
⎧⎨
⎩
≥ 1 for λi = 1
= 1 for λi ∈ (0,1)
≤ 1 for λi = 0.
(12)
Notice that, if λi ∈ (0, 1), the ex ante expected utility of an informed agent of type i (after paying 
the cost ci ) must be equal to the ex ante expected utility of an uninformed agent of that type. We 
now compute the utility ratio:
Lemma 6.2 (Utilities of informed vs uninformed). For given λ,
U Ii
UUi
= e−2rici
[
1 + σ
2
θi
σ 2ηi
(1 − Vi )
]
, (13)
if type i is asymmetrically informed. If type i is differentially informed, we get the same expres-
sion with σ 2η replaced by σ 2 .i i
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incentive to become informed is lower if prices are more informative.
From Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 6.2, it is apparent that the two cases of type i being asym-
metrically or differentially informed are formally identical as far as equilibrium is concerned. 
We will present our equilibrium results for asymmetric information. If type i is differentially 
informed, the corresponding results are obtained simply by replacing σ 2ηi by σ
2
i
.
We assume that agents have an incentive to acquire information if they cannot learn anything 
from the price. Letting
c¯i := 12ri log
[
1 + σ
2
θi
σ 2ηi
]
,
this assumption is equivalent to the following condition (from (13)):
A4. For each type i, ci < c¯i .
This will be a standing assumption (along with assumptions A1–A3 imposed in Section 3) for 
the rest of the paper. It says that the cost ci is low relative to the signal-to-noise ratio σ 2θi /σ
2
ηi
. 
This leads us to the following result, which ensures that equilibrium does not (fully) reveal θi for 
any type i (see Proposition 3.2):
Lemma 6.3 (Partial revelation). An equilibrium vector λ has at least two elements that are 
strictly positive.
Proof. If λi = 0 for all i, the price does not reveal any information to any type. By Assump-
tion A4, all types have an incentive to acquire information, a contradiction. If λj > 0, and λi = 0
for all i = j , the price fully reveals θj , so that there is no incentive for type j agents to engage in 
costly information acquisition in the first place. 
We now specialize the discussion to symmetric economies, i.e. those for which ri , σ 2θi , σ
2
ηi
and 
σ 2i are the same for all i. Then the upper bound on the information acquisition cost c¯i is also the 
same for all i, and as with the other parameters we drop the subscript i. Let
αi := 1 − (e2rci − 1)
σ 2η
σ 2θ
. (14)
This expression is obtained by setting the utility ratio in (13) to one and solving for Vi . Then, 
from (9) and (12), we have:
Lemma 6.4 (Price informativeness vs cost). For a symmetric economy, an equilibrium λ is char-
acterized by
Vi = (R
	
i λ)
2
λ	Rλ
is
⎧⎨
⎩
≤ αi for λi = 1
= αi for λi ∈ (0,1)
≥ αi for λi = 0.
The parameter αi lies in the interval (0,1), due to Assumption A4, and is a strictly decreasing 
function of the cost ci . Whether agents of type i acquire information or not depends on the 
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difference condition is Vi = αi . Without loss of generality, we order the types so that the ci’s 
are in ascending order (c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cN ), or equivalently the αi ’s are in descending order 
(α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αN ). It will often be easier to think in terms of the αi’s rather than the ci’s.
We say that an equilibrium λ is stable if ∂Vi/∂λi ≥ 0 for all i satisfying Vi = αi . If this 
condition is violated, i.e. if Vj = αj and ∂Vj /∂λj < 0 for some j , a small increase in λj will 
lead to prices being less informative about θj , making the increase in λj self-fulfilling; if λj = 1, 
we can apply the same logic for a small decrease in λj . No condition is needed if Vi = αi since 
this inequality continues to hold for a small change in λi . We will only be concerned with stable 
equilibria in this paper. We shall therefore drop the adjective “stable” in what follows, without 
any risk of confusion – henceforth, whenever we refer to an equilibrium, it is implied that it is 
stable.
For the remainder of the paper, we shall restrict ourselves to symmetric economies satisfying 
the additional assumption that ρij = ρ, i = j . This simplifies the analysis and provides us with 
the clearest intuitions. We then need to impose a lower bound on ρ due to
Lemma 6.5 (Lower bound on ρ). Suppose ρij = ρ, for all i = j . Then the correlation matrix R
is positive definite if and only if
ρ > ρmin := − 1
N − 1 .
We denote by E the set of symmetric economies with ρij = ρ > ρmin, i = j .
Our first equilibrium characterization result says that types with a positive mass of informed 
agents can be ranked by price informativeness: for a lower cost type, the proportion of informed 
agents is higher, and price informativeness is higher as well.
Proposition 6.6 (Ranking by price informativeness). Consider an economy in E . Suppose λi and 
λj are nonzero and not both equal to 1. Then the following statements are equivalent: (a) ci < cj , 
(b) λi > λj , and (c) Vi > Vj . The following statements are also equivalent: (a) ci = cj , (b) λi =
λj , and (c) Vi = Vj .
Notably missing from the proposition is a ranking of types for which no agent acquires infor-
mation relative to types for which some agents do. Later, in Proposition 8.2, we show that it is 
possible to have λi = 0 and λj = 1 even though ci < cj . This counterintuitive situation arises 
because of complementarities in information gathering.
The incentive to acquire information depends on the value of the common correlation co-
efficient ρ. Our next result characterizes the values of ρ for which either all agents acquire 
information or none do. More precisely, in the latter case, all agents have an incentive to free ride 
on the information gathering of others, and hence there is no equilibrium.
Proposition 6.7 (Information acquisition: polar cases). Consider an economy in E . There is no 
equilibrium if ρ ≥ √α2.12 There is an equilibrium with λi = 1 for all i if
12 It can be shown that this bound is tight, in the sense that if ρ ∈ (ρmin, √α2), there are parameter values such that an 
equilibrium exists.
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If ρ ≥ √α2, then in fact ρ ≥ √αi for all i ≥ 2 (since α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αN ). Due to the high correla-
tion of types, agents of type i, i ≥ 2, have an incentive to free ride on the information revealed by 
the price. But we know from Lemma 6.3 that in equilibrium there must be at least two types with 
a positive mass of informed agents. Hence there is no equilibrium. Notice that the cutoff value √
α2, beyond which the correlation of types induces too much free riding, is decreasing in the 
cost of information c2 and the noise-to-signal ratio σ 2η /σ 2θ . Evidently, agents are more prone to 
free ride on others’ information if the relative gain from acquiring their own information is small. 
The second part of Proposition 6.7 says that if ρ is sufficiently small, price informativeness is 
low enough to sustain an equilibrium in which all agents of all types acquire information.
The nonexistence result for ρ ≥ √α2 shows how the Grossman–Stiglitz paradox can arise 
in an economy with correlated types, in both the asymmetric information and the differential 
information cases (the Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980 setting with no noise in the aggregate supply 
can be seen as a limiting case of our model with asymmetrically informed types as ρ → 1).
A general characterization of parameters for which an equilibrium exists, beyond the polar 
cases discussed in Proposition 6.7, is an interesting open question that we leave for future work. 
Instead, we focus on a class of equilibria for which we can not only provide readily interpretable 
conditions for existence, but which also lend themselves to a tractable analysis of welfare and 
multiplicity. An equilibrium in this class has the property that Vi < αi , for i = N , regardless 
of the value of λN . It allows us to study the impact of information acquisition by agents of the 
highest cost type, type N , on price informativeness and welfare of all types without having to 
worry about the effect of a change in λN on λi, i = N , since the latter values remain fixed at 
one by Lemma 6.4. Such an equilibrium is parametrized by λN ; accordingly we refer to it as a 
λN -equilibrium. Before providing conditions for existence of a λN -equilibrium, we exogenously 
set λi = 1 for i = N , and investigate the learning spillovers that arise when we perturb λN . Let 
Vj (λN) denote the dependence of Vj on λN , fixing λi = 1 for i = N , and let λ∗ := −ρ(N − 1); 
note that λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if ρ ∈ (ρmin, 0).
Lemma 6.8. Consider an economy in E . Suppose λi = 1 for all i = N . Then we have:
i. ∂Vi/∂λN < 0, for i = N ;
ii. ∂VN/∂λN ∝ λN − λ∗. If ρ < 0, VN(λ∗) = 0.
Thus there is an across-type complementarity: information acquisition by type N agents re-
duces price informativeness for all other types. A higher weight on θN in the price function 
has the effect of increasing the “noise” in the price signal for agents of types other than N . Of 
course, this complementarity translates into a learning externality only in the differential infor-
mation case; in the asymmetric information case, at a λN -equilibrium, agents of type i, i = N , 
do not need to extract any information from the price as they already know θi .
Within-type learning externalities depend on the sign of ρ. Fig. 1 depicts the 3-type case. If 
ρ ≥ 0 (and hence λ∗ ≤ 0), information acquisition by type N makes prices more informative 
for type N itself. However, if ρ is negative, VN is not monotonic in λN . It is decreasing until 
it reaches its minimum value of zero at λN = λ∗, after which it is increasing. The within-type 
complementarity for low values of λN arises because an increase in λN confounds the price 
signal for type N : a higher p could be the result of a higher θN (“good news” for type N ) or 
because of a higher θi, i = N (“bad news” for type N , since ρ < 0).
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, Fig. 1. Price informativeness V3 as a function of λ3, given λ1 = λ2 = 1.
We now turn to the question of existence. A λN -equilibrium exists if ci is lower than some 
cut-off level c∗, for i = N , in order to induce all agents of these types to acquire information. 
An interior λN -equilibrium, i.e. one in which λN ∈ (0, 1), exists under the additional condition 
that cN lies in an interval to the right of c∗, so that some but not all agents of type N become 
informed.
Proposition 6.9 (λN -equilibrium). Consider an economy in E . Then there are scalars c∗, c∗∗ and 
c∗∗∗, satisfying 0 < c∗ < c∗∗ < c∗∗∗ ≤ c¯, such that
i. A λN -equilibrium exists if N ≥ 3, and ci ∈ (0, c∗) for i = N . It is unique if ρ ≥ 0.
ii. An interior λN -equilibrium exists if ci ∈ (0, c∗) for i = N , and cN ∈ (c∗∗, c∗∗∗). It is unique 
regardless of the value of ρ, with λN > λ∗.
The condition N ≥ 3 in Proposition 6.9 (part (i)) is needed to ensure that an equilibrium exists 
even if λN happens to be zero (if N = 2, there would be no such equilibrium due to Lemma 6.3).
Consider the 3-type case shown in Fig. 1. If ρ ≥ 0, there is a unique λ3-equilibrium. For ρ =
0.2 and α3 = 0.3, this equilibrium is at point a in Fig. 1a. The possibility of multiple λ3-equilibria 
arises if ρ is negative. We will discuss multiplicity in Section 8. For now we note that even if ρ is 
negative, there is a unique interior λ3-equilibrium. For the case where ρ = −0.2 and α3 = 0.05, 
this equilibrium corresponds to point A in Fig. 1b. Point B is not an equilibrium because it is not 
stable.
Information spillovers at an interior λN -equilibrium will feature prominently in our welfare 
analysis. At such an equilibrium λN > λ∗ by Proposition 6.9 (part (ii)). It then follows from 
Lemma 6.8 (part (ii)) that there is no within-type complementarity for type N . In Fig. 1b, we 
see that such a complementarity is excluded by the stability criterion (which is satisfied at A but 
not at B). On the other hand, across-type complementarities for types other than N apply at any 
λN -equilibrium by Lemma 6.8 (part (i)). To summarize:
Corollary 6.10. Consider an economy in E . At an interior λN -equilibrium, we have ∂VN/∂λN > 0
and ∂Vi/∂λN < 0 for i = N .
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not given by Lemma 6.1, but the utility ratio U Ii /UUi is similar to that given by (13). We show in 
Appendix B (see equation (57)) that
U Ii
UUi
= e−2rici
⎡
⎣1 + 1
σ 2v
[
r2i σ
2
θi
(1 − Vi )
]−1 − (ρ2vei )−1
⎤
⎦ ,
where ρvei := corr(v, ei). As in (13), U Ii /UUi depends on λ only through price informative-
ness Vi , and is decreasing in Vi . This leads to a different cutoff c¯i , a slightly different definition 
of a symmetric economy (in this case it is one in which ri , σ 2θi and ρ2vei are the same for all i), 
and a different (decreasing and invertible) mapping αi : (0, c¯) → (0, 1), analogous to (14). With 
these modifications, all the results in this section from Lemma 6.3 onwards apply to Example 4.4
(and so do our multiplicity results in Section 8; however, the welfare analysis in the next section 
does not, since it relies on Lemma 6.1).
7. Welfare
In this section we consider the effect of information acquisition by agents of a given type on 
their own welfare as well as on the welfare of agents of other types.13 A key role is played by the 
information conveyed by prices. The effect of price informativeness on welfare is not unambigu-
ous, however. On the one hand, higher price informativeness for agents of type i (a higher Vi ) 
leads to better portfolio decisions for these agents. On the other hand, it is associated with prices 
being closer to their valuation vi , so that the gains from trade that they can exploit are smaller.14
As we shall see, the welfare of type i agents is increasing in σ 2vi−p . While Vi and σ 2vi−p are not 
bound by a tight functional relationship, these two variables tend to be inversely related. If agents 
have sufficiently precise private information, so that learning from prices is relatively unimpor-
tant for them, they prefer prices to be less revealing. Conversely, if there is a lot of noise in their 
signals, they are better off if prices are more informative.
Imagine a hypothetical planner who can perturb the cost of gathering information and thereby 
the information acquisition decisions of agents. In general, a change in the cost of information 
for any one type will affect the proportions of informed agents of every type. We sidestep this 
difficulty by restricting ourselves to a λN -equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, a local change in 
cN affects λN , and hence Vi for all i, but for i = N leaves λi unchanged at 1. Moreover, at an 
interior λN -equilibrium, it is straightforward to characterize the effect of a local change in cN :
Lemma 7.1. Consider an economy in E . At an interior λN -equilibrium, we have ∂λN/∂cN < 0, 
∂VN/∂cN < 0 and ∂Vi/∂cN > 0 for i = N .
Thus, in a neighborhood of an interior λN -equilibrium, a higher cost of information acquisition 
for type N agents results in fewer of them acquiring information. By Corollary 6.10, this reduces 
price informativeness for type N while increasing it for all other types.
13 We carry out a conventional welfare analysis under the assumption that agents’ objective functions are a faithful 
representation of their welfare. This may not be the case if the heterogeneity in valuations arises from behavioral consid-
erations.
14 We can see from the optimal portfolio of type i, given by (2), that these agents tend to go long when vi > p and 
short when vi < p; there are gains from trade for type i only to the extent that the price does not perfectly reflect their 
valuation.
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ther asymmetrically informed (σ 2i = 0, for all i) or differentially informed (σ 2ηi = 0, for all i). 
As far as information acquisition is concerned, these two cases are formally identical, involv-
ing only a change of notation (due to Lemma 6.2). However, as is apparent from Lemma 6.1, 
they do require a separate welfare analysis. We provide results for the more interesting case 
of differential information (as we noted earlier, across-type learning externalities do not arise 
at a λN -equilibrium in the asymmetric information case, since agents of type i, i = N , already 
know θi ). From Lemma 6.1, ex ante utilities in the differential information case are:
U Ii = e−2rci
[
σ 2θ
σ 2
+ (1 − Vi )−1
]
σ 2vi−p
σ 2θ
, i = N, (15)
UUN = U IN = (1 − VN)−1 ·
σ 2vN−p
σ 2θ
. (16)
Notice that, for any type j , for given price informativeness Vj , utility is increasing in σ 2vj−p; 
likewise, for given σ 2vj−p , it is increasing in Vj .
Proposition 7.2 (Welfare). Consider an economy in E . Suppose N ≥ 3 and all types are differ-
entially informed. Then, in a neighborhood of an interior λN -equilibrium:
i. The utility of type N agents is strictly increasing in cN ;
ii. The utility of type i agents, i = N , is strictly increasing in cN if σ 2θ /σ 2 is sufficiently low; 
and
iii. The utility of type i agents, i = N , is strictly decreasing in cN if σ 2θ /σ 2 is sufficiently high.
The welfare effects of an increase in cN are all mediated by the induced reduction in λN . 
A lower λN makes type N agents better off. The effect on the welfare of other types depends on 
the signal-to-noise ratio σ 2θ /σ 2 . If private signals are sufficiently noisy (the signal-to-noise ratio 
is sufficiently low), they are better off. On the other hand, if private information is sufficiently 
precise, their welfare is lower. In particular, in the case of noisy private signals, there is excessive 
information acquisition in equilibrium: reducing the proportion of informed agents of the highest 
cost type leads to a Pareto improvement.
For type N agents, incentives to gather information are misaligned with their own objectives: 
(at the margin) they choose to collect information even though they are worse off in the en-
suing equilibrium. Restricting information acquisition by these agents reduces the amount that 
they learn from prices. This adverse information effect, and the higher cost of acquiring private 
information, are outweighed by greater trading gains (as measured by a higher σ 2vN−p).15
The learning externality for the other types goes in the opposite direction. Information acqui-
sition by type N agents interferes with learning from prices by agents of types other than N (and 
this is true regardless of the value of ρ). This across-type complementarity is responsible for the 
somewhat counterintuitive result that discouraging information acquisition is Pareto improving 
precisely when prices have an important role to play in information aggregation.
15 This is reminiscent of the result in Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015) that investors may be better off with no information, 
though in our case E(vi − p) is always zero, so the utility gain cannot be attributed to investors being able to trade a 
“high-risk, high-return asset”.
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In this section we show how the presence of a within-type complementarity can lead to multi-
ple equilibria. We also compare price informativeness across equilibria. Given two equilibria E
and E′, we say that E informationally dominates E′ if price informativeness is strictly higher at 
E for every type. Recall that λ∗ := −ρ(N − 1).
Proposition 8.1 (Multiple equilibria). Consider an economy in E . Suppose N ≥ 3, ρ < 0, and 
ci ∈ (0, c∗) for i = N . Then there is a c∗N ∈ (0, c¯) such that if cN ∈ (c∗N, c¯), there are two 
λN -equilibria: with λN = 0 and with λN ∈ (λ∗, 1]. The first equilibrium informationally domi-
nates the second one.
The condition that ci ∈ (0, c∗), i = N , ensures that a λN -equilibrium exists. This is taken from 
Proposition 6.9, which also tells us that ρ must be negative for there to be multiple λN -equilibria. 
The lower bound on cN is needed to sustain the equilibrium in which λN = 0.16
When ρ is negative, VN is not monotonic in λN – there is a within-type complementarity 
for λN < λ∗ (Lemma 6.8 (part (ii)). In order to understand how this complementarity drives 
multiplicity, it is instructive to take a detailed look at the 3-type case, depicted in Fig. 1b. Consider 
first the plot of V3(λ3) for ρ = −0.2. There is a unique equilibrium for α3 ≥ 0.1: λ3 lies in the 
interval [0.8, 1] and is increasing in α3 (or, equivalently, decreasing in c3). If α3 = 0.1, we have 
V3 = α3 at λ3 = 0. However, this does not qualify as an equilibrium by our definition since it 
is not stable. The cutoff value c∗3 corresponds to α3 = 0.1. The case of α3 = 0.05 is shown in 
the figure. There are two equilibria,17 indicated by points A and C (as we noted earlier, B is 
unstable).18 Perversely, type 3 agents learn more from the price when none of them acquire 
information (point C). Agents of types 1 and 2 also learn more from the price at C than at A; 
this is a consequence of the across-type complementarity identified in Lemma 6.8 (part (i)).
Suppose we are initially at point C, with α3 just below 0.1. Consider an increase in α3. As 
α3 crosses 0.1, there is a discontinuous jump in λ3 from 0 to 0.8. A small decrease in the cost 
of information sets off a “frenzy” of information gathering for type 3 agents, with the proportion 
of informed agents jumping from 0 to 80%. As soon as α3 exceeds 0.1, the cost of information 
is low enough to justify acquiring it. But as more agents acquire the information, prices become 
less informative, inducing even more agents to acquire information. The same discontinuous 
jump in information acquisition arises if α3 is just below 0.1, and there is a small increase in the 
uncertainty facing uninformed agents, as measured by σ 2θ . This has the effect of reducing |ρ|, 
shifting the curve downwards.19
Now consider the plot for ρ = −0.3. Again start with λ3 = 0 with α3 < 0.257. As α3 in-
creases beyond this cutoff value, the equilibrium jumps to λ3 = 1. A small decrease in the cost 
16 For sufficiently low values of ρ it turns out that c∗
N
< c∗, though of course cN ≥ ci for all i.
17 Equilibrium multiplicity is generated by the non-monotonicity of price informativeness as a function of the proportion 
of informed traders. This is in contrast to Ganguli and Yang (2009) where multidimensional information leads to two 
equilibrium price functions for any given allocation of private information. For one price function price informativeness 
is monotonically increasing in the proportion of informed traders, while for the other price function it is monotonically 
decreasing.
18 Note that for α3 < 0.1, λ3 = 0 is a stable equilibrium. If λ3 increases by a small amount from 0, price informativeness 
V3, which is continuous in λ3, still remains above α3.
19 The magnitude of ρ can also be affected by a public signal about θ , or by market size as in Rostek and Weretka 
(2012).
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formation. In this case, there is also a discontinuous downward jump in price informativeness 
for type 3 agents. Of course, at λ3 = 1, the information revealed by the price is only relevant in 
the differential information case (in the asymmetric information case, the agents’ private signals 
already tell them what θ3 is). With differential information, it is indeed possible that each type 3 
agent learns less about his valuation when all type 3 agents acquire information, even when he 
combines his private signal with the information contained in the price.
Next, we show that, under a tighter condition on ρ, equilibrium multiplicity can be much more 
pronounced than is suggested by Proposition 8.1. For this result, we focus on equilibria wherein 
λi is either 0 or 1 for all i. We say that type i is uninformed if λi = 0 and informed if λi = 1.
Proposition 8.2 (Multiple equilibria II). Consider an economy in E . Suppose N ≥ 3, and ρ <
−N−1. Then, for an open set of cost parameters (ci)Ni=1, and for all integers m satisfying N/2 <
m ≤ N , there exists an equilibrium in which m types are informed and the remaining (N − m)
types are uninformed. At any such equilibrium, price informativeness for the uninformed types is 
strictly higher than price informativeness for the informed types. Furthermore, the equilibrium 
in which all types are informed is informationally dominated by any equilibrium in which some 
types are uninformed.
The proposition says that, in the presence of a sufficiently strong complementarity, there is a 
plethora of equilibria. The equilibrium in which all agents of all types acquire information is 
actually the worst in terms of price informativeness: prices would be more informative for every-
one if one or more types switch to not acquiring any information. The allocation of types to the 
informed and uninformed groups is arbitrary. Thus there are equilibria in which the types that 
acquire information have a higher cost than the types that do not.
The results of this section require a negative correlation between agent valuations. We focus 
on the more tractable case where all pairwise correlations are the same, but this is not an essential 
assumption. Negative correlations can arise due to hedging motives, which can easily be incor-
porated in our model as in Example 4.4. In many markets, negative correlations are a natural 
consequence of hedgers being on opposite sides in another market. Suppose, for instance, that 
the asset in Example 4.4 is a wheat futures contract and types i and j are producers of wheat 
and of bread respectively. Then the covariances σvei and σvej are of opposite sign, while the 
scale factors yi and yj , which we can think of as the projected size of the wheat crop and the 
demand for bread respectively, comove with the economy as a whole, and hence are positively 
correlated. Thus the correlation between the valuations of these two types, which is given by 
corr(σvei yi, σvej yj ) = −corr(yi, yj ), is negative.
The complementarity result in Goldstein et al. (2014) has a similar flavor to ours: it is driven 
by a sufficiently strong hedging motive that makes a subset of informed investors trade in the 
opposite direction to others who only have a speculative motive. Another plausible scenario that 
can generate negatively correlated valuations, described by Barlevy and Veronesi (2008), is one 
where some agents have access to a private technology the returns on which are higher in good 
times, when the asset fundamental is also high. These agents sell the asset in order to free up 
resources for other projects.
While it should be clear that our results on both welfare and equilibrium multiplicity are driven 
by information spillovers, the nature of these spillovers is different for these two sets of results. 
Multiplicity is a consequence of the non-monotonicity of Vi with respect to λi , i.e. within-type 
complementarities. Across-type complementarities account for one equilibrium informationally 
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entirely governed by across-type complementarities, in particular the fact that less information 
acquisition by type N makes prices more informative for all other types. Within-type comple-
mentarities play no role here. Even in the case where VN is not monotonic in λN , it is nevertheless 
increasing in a neighborhood of an interior λN -equilibrium. Our welfare result is a local one, and 
locally there is no within-type complementarity, regardless of the sign of ρ.
9. Concluding remarks
We study competitive rational expectations equilibria in an economy in which agents have 
interdependent private valuations for the risky asset. For any given allocation of private infor-
mation, there is a unique linear equilibrium price function that takes a very simple form. We 
characterize the endogenous distribution of private information when agents can choose whether 
or not to pay for it. We highlight the role of learning externalities within and across types of 
agents. When private signals are noisy and agents rely primarily on the information transmitted 
by prices, raising the cost of information collection for the highest cost type, and thereby curtail-
ing their information gathering activities, can make all types better off. When valuations across 
types are negatively correlated, multiple equilibria can arise.
A number of open questions remain. Relaxing our symmetry assumptions, especially with 
regard to the correlations ρij , could lead to a deeper understanding of learning spillovers and 
their effect on incentives to produce information. Our welfare analysis is also incomplete, since 
we restrict ourselves to λN -equilibria. An interesting extension of our framework would be to 
allow agents to choose what information to acquire, as they may well prefer to be informed 
about the valuation of a type other than their own.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The assumption that σ 2θi |p > 0 ensures that the covariance matrix of 
(sin, p) is nonsingular even if σ 2i = 0. The conditional expectations of vi , given {sin, p} and p, 
respectively, are:
E(vi |sin,p) = [σ 2θi σθip]
[
σ 2θi + σ 2i σθip
σθip σ
2
p
]−1 [
sin
p
]
= 1
(σ 2θi + σ 2i )σ 2p − σ 2θi ,p
· [σ 2θi σθip]
[
σ 2p −σθip
−σθip σ 2θi + σ 2i
][
sin
p
]
= 1
(σ 2θi + σ 2i )σ 2p − σ 2θi ,p
·
[
(σ 2θi σ
2
p − σ 2θi ,p)sin + σθipσ 2i p
]
= 1
σ 2θi + σ 2i − βiσθip
·
[
(σ 2θi − βiσθip)sin + βiσ 2i p
]
= 1
σ 2θi |p + σ 2i
·
(
σ 2θi |psin + βiσ 2i p
)
,
and
E(vi |p) = σθip
σ 2p
p = βip.
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Var(vi |sin,p) = σ 2vi − [σ 2θi σθip]
[
σ 2θi + σ 2i σθip
σθip σ
2
p
]−1 [
σ 2θi
σθip
]
= σ 2vi −
1
(σ 2θi + σ 2i )σ 2p − σ 2θi ,p
· [σ 2θi σθip]
[
σ 2p −σθip
−σθip σ 2θi + σ 2i
][
σ 2θi
σθip
]
= σ 2vi −
1
(σ 2θi + σ 2i )σ 2p − σ 2θi ,p
·
[
(σ 2θi σ
2
p − σ 2θi ,p)σ 2θi + σ 2θi ,pσ 2i
]
= σ 2vi −
1
σ 2θi + σ 2i − βiσθip
·
[
(σ 2θi − βiσθip)σ 2θi + βiσθipσ 2i
]
= σ 2ηi +
(σ 2θi − βiσθip)σ 2i
σ 2θi + σ 2i − βiσθip
= σ 2ηi +
σ 2θi |pσ
2
i
σ 2θi |p + σ 2i
,
and
Var(vi |p) = σ 2θi |p + σ 2ηi .
Plugging these conditional moments into (2), we get the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We proceed under the provisional assumption that σ 2θi |p > 0 for all i, 
i.e. the price function does not (fully) reveal θi for any i. We will verify later that this assumption 
does in fact hold. From (4),
qi = γiθi − kip, (17)
where
γi := λi
ri
· σ
2
θi |p
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )σ 2ηi + σ 2θi |pσ 2i
, (18)
and
ki := λi
ri
· σ
2
θi |p + (1 − βi)σ 2i
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )σ 2ηi + σ 2θi |pσ 2i
+ 1 − λi
ri
· 1 − βi
σ 2θi |p + σ 2ηi
. (19)
Using the market-clearing condition, 
∑
i qi = 0, we obtain:(∑
i
ki
)
p =
∑
i
γiθi . (20)
Suppose first that 
∑
i ki = 0. Then, 
∑
i γiθi = 0. Due to the positive definiteness of the co-
variance matrix of θ , we must have γi = 0 for all i. Since σ 2θi |p > 0 by assumption, it follows 
from (18) that λi = 0 for all i. But this contradicts Assumption A1, which says that λi > 0 for at 
least two types. We conclude that 
∑
i ki = 0.
We can now solve (20) for the price function p, and we see that it is indeed given by (5), with 
k = (∑i ki)−1. From (18), it is immediate that γi = λi(riσ 2ηi )−1 if σ 2i = 0 (type i is asymmetri-
cally informed), while γi = λi(riσ 2 )−1 if σ 2η = 0 (type i is differentially informed).i i
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for all i). Suppose not, say p reveals θj . Then, since the covariance matrix of θ is positive 
definite, so that θj is not perfectly correlated with any linear combination of the remaining θi’s, 
we must have p = aj θj , aj = 0. Since p does not reveal θi for i = j , equations (17)–(19) still 
hold for i = j . For type j , Lemma 3.1 does not apply, but qj can be calculated directly from 
(2). Assuming for the moment that σ 2ηj > 0, qj = (θj − p)(rj σ 2ηj )−1. Thus qj is given by (17), 
with γj = kj = (rj σ 2ηj )−1. From (20), we see that 
∑
i ki = 0, for otherwise γi = 0 for all i, 
a contradiction. Hence the price function is given by (5). But since p = aj θj , γi = 0 for all i = j , 
which in turn implies that λi = 0 for all i = j . This contradicts Assumption A1. For the case 
where σ 2ηj = 0, we must have p = θj , and the optimal trade of a type j agent is indeterminate. 
However, the aggregate trade of type j is pinned down by market clearing, i.e. qj = − ∑i =j qi =∑
i =j (kip−γiθi) =
∑
i =j (kiθj −γiθi). Invoking Assumption A3, qj is measurable with respect 
to the information of type j agents. Hence, we must have γi = 0 for all i = j , leading to the same 
contradiction that we arrived at above. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1. We have
VIi =
(
σ 2θi −
σ 4θi
σ 2θi
+σ 2i
)
− (σ
2
θi
−βiσθip)σ 2i
σ 2θi
+σ 2i −βiσθip
σ 2θi −
σ 4θi
σ 2θi
+σ 2i
= βiσθipσ
2
i
σ 2θi (σ
2
θi
+ σ 2i − βiσθip)
= Viσ
2
i
(1 − Vi )σ 2θi + σ 2i
.
The result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2. From (8), it is immediate that
Vi = (R
	
i λ)
2
λ	Rλ
.
Differentiating this expression, we obtain
∂Vi
∂λi
= 2R
	
i λ
[
λ	Rλ − (R	i λ)2
]
(λ	Rλ)2
= 2R
	
i λ(1 − Vi )
λ	Rλ
∝ R	i λ,
where we have used the fact that Vi ∈ [0, 1). 
Proof of Lemma 6.1. With the understanding that the cost ci is paid by agent in only if he is 
informed, his ex ante expected utility is
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[
E(exp(−riWin)|Iin)
]
= −ericiE[exp(−riEin)], (21)
where
Ein := E(Win|Iin) − ri2 Var(Win|Iin)
= [E(vi |Iin) − p]qin − ri2 q2inVar(vi |Iin).
From (2), E(vi |Iin) − p = riqinVar(vi |Iin). Therefore,
Ein = ri2 q
2
inVar(vi |Iin).
Substituting for qin from Lemma 3.1,
−riEIin = −
1
2
·
[
σ 2θi |psin −
[
σ 2θi |p + (1 − βi)σ 2i
]
p
]2
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )
[
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )σ 2ηi + σ 2θi |pσ 2i
] ,
−riEUin = −
1
2
· (1 − βi)
2
σ 2θi |p + σ 2ηi
p2.
In order to evaluate (21), we invoke the fact that if x ∼ N(0, σ 2), then E[e− 12 x2 ] = (1 + σ 2)− 12 . 
Using the definition of Uin given by (11), we obtain
U Iin = e−2rici
[
1 + (σ
2
θi
+σ 2i )σ 4θi |p+
[
σ 2θi |p+(1−βi)σ
2
i
]2
σ 2p−2
[
σ 2θi |p+(1−βi)σ
2
i
]
σ 2θi |pσθip
(σ 2θi |p+σ 2i )
[
(σ 2θi |p+σ 2i )σ 2ηi +σ
2
θi |pσ
2
i
]
]
,
which, after some algebraic manipulation, gives us the expression for U Iin in the statement of the 
lemma. Also,
UUin = 1 +
(1 − βi)2σ 2p
σ 2θi |p + σ 2ηi
,
which yields the desired expression for UUin . 
Proof of Lemma 6.2. From Lemma 6.1:
U Ii
UUi
= e−2rici · (σ
2
θi |p + σ 2i )(σ 2θi |p + σ 2ηi )
(σ 2θi |p + σ 2i )σ 2ηi + σ 2θi |pσ 2i
= e−2rici
[
1 + σ
4
θi |p
σ 2θi |p(σ
2
i
+ σ 2ηi ) + σ 2i σ 2ηi
]
.
If type i is asymmetrically informed (σ 2i = 0), we get
U Ii
UUi
= e−2rici
[
1 + σ
2
θi |p
σ 2ηi
]
.
Substituting for σ 2θi |p , using (7), gives us the desired expression for the utility ratio. In the differ-
ential information case (σ 2ηi = 0), we get the same expression with σ 2ηi replaced by σ 2i . 
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is in the j ’th place. Then R1 = [1 +ρ(N −1)]1, and Rvj = (1 −ρ)vj , for j = 2, 3, . . . , N . Thus 
the eigenvalues of R are [1 + ρ(N − 1)] and (1 − ρ), the latter with multiplicity N − 1. Since 
R is a symmetric matrix, it is positive definite if and only if all its eigenvalues are positive, i.e. if 
and only if 1 + ρ(N − 1) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6.6. Specializing (9) to the case where ρij = ρ for all i = j , we obtain the 
following expression for price informativeness for type i, for an economy in E :
Vi =
[
(1 − ρ)λi + ρ∑k λk]2
(1 − ρ)∑k λ2k + ρ(∑k λk)2 . (22)
Now consider an equilibrium λ. Due to the stability condition, for all 	 satisfying V	 = α	, we 
have ∂V	/∂λ	 ≥ 0, and hence R		 λ ≥ 0 (from (10)). In addition, V	 = α	 implies that V	 > 0, so 
that R		 λ = 0 (from (9)). Thus R		 λ > 0, i.e.
(1 − ρ)λ	 + ρ
∑
k
λk > 0, (23)
for all 	 satisfying V	 = α	. In particular, this is the case if λ	 ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if λ	 = 1, the 
LHS of (23) is equal to 1 + ρ∑k =	 λk , which is positive since ρ > ρmin. Thus (23) applies as 
long as λ	 ∈ (0, 1], and in particular for 	 = i, j in the statement of the proposition. It follows 
that λi > λj if and only if Vi > Vj , and λi = λj if and only if Vi = Vj . It remains to show that 
ci < cj if and only if Vi > Vj (since we can reverse the indices i and j , this in turn implies that 
ci = cj if and only if Vi = Vj ).
Suppose first that Vi > Vj . Then λi > λj and hence λj ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, αi ≥ Vi >
Vj = αj , so that ci < cj . Next suppose that ci < cj , or equivalently αi > αj . If Vi ≤ Vj , we 
have λi ≤ λj , implying that λi ∈ (0, 1), and αi > αj ≥ Vj ≥ Vi = αi , a contradiction. Therefore 
Vi > Vj . 
Proof of Proposition 6.7. Let
λˆi := λi∑
k =i λk
, and δi :=
∑
k =i λ2k(∑
k =i λk
)2 ,
which are well-defined for any i since 
∑
k =i λk > 0 by Lemma 6.3. Using (22), we can write Vi
as follows:
Vi =
[
λi + ρ∑k =i λk]2
(1 − ρ)[λ2i +∑k =i λ2k]+ ρ[λi +∑k =i λk]2
= (λˆi + ρ)
2
(1 − ρ)(λˆ2i + δi) + ρ(λˆi + 1)2
= (λˆi + ρ)
2
(λˆi + ρ)2 + (1 − ρ)(δi + ρ)
. (24)
Notice that Vi is strictly decreasing in δi and, if ρ ≥ 0, strictly increasing in λˆi . Hence, provided 
ρ ≥ 0, a lower bound for Vi is obtained from (24) by setting λˆi equal to its lowest possible value, 
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only one type k, k = i, for which λk > 0). This gives us Vi ≥ ρ2; if λi > 0, we have Vi > ρ2.
By Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4, there are at least two types for which λi > 0 and consequently 
Vi ≤ αi . If ρ ≥ 0, we must therefore have ρ2 < Vi ≤ αi for these two types, implying that ρ <√
α2 (recall that we have ranked the αk’s in descending order). Thus there is no equilibrium if 
ρ ≥ √α2.
Now suppose λi = 1 for all i. Then Vi = V¯ , where
V¯ = 1 + ρ(N − 1)
N
.
This is an equilibrium provided all agents have a (weak) incentive to acquire information, i.e. if 
V¯ ≤ αi for all i, or V¯ ≤ αN . From this we obtain the upper bound on ρ in the proposition. 
Proof of Lemma 6.8. From (22), imposing the condition that λi = 1 for i = N , we have:
Vi =
[
(1 − ρ) + ρ(N − 1 + λN)
]2
(1 − ρ)(N − 1 + λ2N) + ρ(N − 1 + λN)2
, i = N, (25)
VN =
[
(1 − ρ)λN + ρ(N − 1 + λN)
]2
(1 − ρ)(N − 1 + λ2N) + ρ(N − 1 + λN)2
. (26)
We can rewrite VN as follows:
VN = (λN − λ
∗)2
λ	Rλ
. (27)
Using (25) and (27), and the fact that ρ > ρmin, we can directly verify both statements of the 
lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 6.9. For i = N , we fix λi = 1 and look for a condition on the αi’s such 
that Vi (λN) < αi , irrespective of the value of λN ∈ [0, 1]. From Lemma 6.8 (part (i)), we see that 
Vi (λN) is maximized at λN = 0. Hence the following condition suffices for the existence of a 
λN -equilibrium (using (25)):
αi > α
∗ := Vi (0) = 1 + ρ(N − 2)
N − 1 , i = N. (28)
Next, we look for further conditions that ensure that λN ∈ (0, 1). For this we need to con-
sider the function VN(λN) given by (26), and in particular its shape as described by Lemma 6.8
(part (ii)). By Lemma 6.4, we must have VN = αN . We consider separately the cases of ρ < 0
and ρ ≥ 0.
If ρ < 0, there are two candidates for an interior equilibrium. These are illustrated in Fig. 1b 
as points A and B . However, at B the stability condition, ∂VN/∂λN ≥ 0, does not hold. This 
leaves us with the equilibrium corresponding to point A, at which λN > λ∗ > 0. To ensure that 
λN < 1, we impose the following condition:
αN < α
∗∗ := VN(1) = 1 + ρ(N − 1)
N
. (29)
Note that the foregoing analysis depends only on Lemma 6.8 (part (ii)), not on the particular 
parameters (N = 3, ρ = −0.2) chosen for Fig. 1b.
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the case where ρ < 0. In order to ensure that λN > 0, we require that
αN > α
∗∗∗ := VN(0) = ρ
2(N − 1)
1 + ρ(N − 2) . (30)
It is straightforward to check that α∗ > α∗∗ regardless of the sign of ρ, and α∗∗ > α∗∗∗ if ρ ≥ 0.
Provided the conditions for existence are satisfied, the uniqueness results follow from 
Lemma 6.8 (part (ii)). If ρ ≥ 0, VN(λN) is strictly increasing on [0, 1]. Hence there is a unique 
λN -equilibrium whether or not it is in the interior. If ρ < 0, at an interior λN -equilibrium we 
have λN > λ∗; it must be unique since VN(λN) is strictly increasing on the interval [λ∗, 1].
Finally, we write the conditions (28), (29) and (30) on the αi ’s in terms of the corresponding 
ci ’s from (14). The scalars c∗ and c∗∗ correspond to α∗ and α∗∗, respectively. The scalar c∗∗∗
corresponds to α∗∗∗ if ρ ≥ 0; if ρ < 0, c∗∗∗ is just the assumed upper bound on cN , given by c¯. 
Thus we have 0 < c∗ < c∗∗ < c∗∗∗ ≤ c¯. 
Proof of Lemma 7.1. At an interior λN -equilibrium, writing λN as a function of cN , we have 
the identity VN(λN(cN)) = αN(cN). Hence
∂VN
∂cN
= ∂VN
∂λN
· ∂λN
∂cN
= ∂αN
∂cN
.
Since ∂VN/∂λN > 0 (Corollary 6.10), and ∂αN/∂cN < 0 (from (14)), it follows that ∂λN/∂cN <
0, and ∂VN/∂cN < 0. For i = N , ∂Vi/∂cN > 0 since ∂Vi/∂λN < 0 (Corollary 6.10). 
Proof of Proposition 7.2. In order to evaluate the utility expressions (15) and (16), we begin by 
calculating σ 2vi−p/σ
2
θ . From Proposition 3.2,
p = k
rσ 2
· λ	θ .
Therefore,
σ 2p = σ 2θ
(
k
rσ 2
)2
λ	Rλ,
σθip = σ 2θ
(
k
rσ 2
)
R	i λ,
so that
βi = σθip
σ 2p
= rσ 2 k−1 ·
R	i λ
λ	Rλ
,
σ 2θi |p = σ 2θ − βiσθip = σ 2θ (1 − Vi ).
From (19):
ki = λi
rσ 2
+ 1
r
· 1 − βi
σ 2θi |p
= 1
rσ 2
⎡
⎣λi + 1 − rσ 2 k−1 ·
R	i λ
λ	Rλ
ζ(1 − Vi )
⎤
⎦ ,
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∑
i ki)
−1
, we obtain
k−1 = 1
rσ 2
⎡
⎣∑
i
λi +
∑
i
1 − rσ 2 k−1 · R
	
i λ
λ	Rλ
ζ(1 − Vi )
⎤
⎦ .
Now we can solve for k:
k = rσ 2 ·
ζ +∑i (1 − Vi )−1 R	i λλ	Rλ
ζ
∑
i λi +
∑
i (1 − Vi )−1
. (31)
We have
σ 2vi−p = σ 2θ + σ 2p − 2σθip
= σ 2θ + σ 2θ
(
k
rσ 2
)2
λ	Rλ − 2σ 2θ
(
k
rσ 2
)
R	i λ,
so that
σ 2vi−p
σ 2θ
= 1 + k
rσ 2
[
k
rσ 2
λ	Rλ − 2R	i λ
]
.
Let
φ := k
rσ 2
λ	Rλ, and φi := φ − R	i λ. (32)
Then we can write
σ 2vi−p
σ 2θ
= 1 + (λ	Rλ)−1φ(φ − 2R	i λ)
= 1 + (λ	Rλ)−1
[
φ2i − (R	i λ)2
]
= 1 − Vi + (λ	Rλ)−1φ2i .
From (15) and (16),
U Ii = e−2rci
[
ζ + (1 − Vi )−1
][
1 − Vi + (λ	Rλ)−1φ2i
]
, i = N, (33)
UUN = 1 + (1 − VN)−1(λ	Rλ)−1φ2N . (34)
Our calculations so far apply for arbitrary λ. Now we restrict ourselves to an interior 
λN -equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, U Ii and UUN depend on cN only through λN , and hence 
it suffices to sign their derivatives with respect to λN , and use the fact that ∂λN/∂cN < 0
(Lemma 7.1). We do not need to consider U IN separately since, at an interior λN -equilibrium, 
it is equal to UUN , and these two utilities remain equal as we perturb cN .
Setting λi = 1, for i = N , we get
R	i λ = R	1 λ = 1 + ρ(N − 2) + ρλN, i = N,
R	Nλ = ρ(N − 1) + λN,
λ	Rλ = (N − 1)R	1 λ + λNR	Nλ
= (N − 1)[1 + ρ(N − 2)] + 2(N − 1)ρλN + λ2N.
586 R. Rahi, J.-P. Zigrand / Journal of Economic Theory 177 (2018) 558–593Notice that
R	1 λ − R	Nλ = (1 − ρ)(1 − λN). (35)
For i = N , we have Vi = V1. From (9),
(1 − V1)−1 = 11 − ρ ·
λ	Rλ
D
, (36)
where
D := (N − 2)[1 + ρ(N − 2)] + 2(N − 2)ρλN + (1 + ρ)λ2N,
and
(1 − VN)−1 = 11 − ρ ·
λ	Rλ
(N − 1)[1 + ρ(N − 1)] . (37)
Note that (1 − Vi )−1 > 0 for all i. In particular, D > 0 and 1 + ρ(N − 1) > 0 (the latter is just a 
restatement of the condition that ρ > ρmin). From (31) and (32),
φ = ζλ
	Rλ + (N − 1)(1 − V1)−1R	1 λ + (1 − VN)−1R	Nλ
ζ(N − 1 + λN) + (N − 1)(1 − V1)−1 + (1 − VN)−1 .
For i = N , φi = φ1. Using (32) and (35),
φ1 = ζ
[
λ	Rλ − (N − 1 + λN)R	1 λ
]+ (1 − VN)−1[R	Nλ − R	1 λ]
ζ(N − 1 + λN) + (N − 1)(1 − V1)−1 + (1 − VN)−1
= − (1 − ρ)(1 − λN)
[
ζλN + (1 − VN)−1
]
ζ(N − 1 + λN) + (N − 1)(1 − V1)−1 + (1 − VN)−1
= − (1 − ρ)(1 − λN)
1 + (N − 1) · ζ+(1−V1)−1
ζλN+(1−VN )−1
, (38)
and
φN = ζ
[
λ	Rλ − (N − 1 + λN)R	Nλ
]+ (N − 1)(1 − V1)−1[R	1 λ − R	Nλ]
ζ(N − 1 + λN) + (N − 1)(1 − V1)−1 + (1 − VN)−1
= (N − 1)(1 − ρ)(1 − λN)
[
ζ + (1 − V1)−1
]
ζ(N − 1 + λN) + (N − 1)(1 − V1)−1 + (1 − VN)−1
= (N − 1)(1 − ρ)(1 − λN)
N − 1 + ζλN+(1−VN )−1
ζ+(1−V1)−1
.
From (34) and (37), ∂UUN /∂λN ∝ φN ·∂φN/∂λN . Clearly φN is positive. Since ∂VN/∂λN > 0
and ∂V1/∂λN < 0 (Lemma 7.1), we see that ∂φN/∂λN < 0. Hence, ∂UUN /∂λN < 0. This estab-
lishes statement (i) of the proposition.
In order to prove statements (ii) and (iii), we show that limζ→0 ∂U I1 /∂λN < 0, and 
limζ→∞ ∂U I1 /∂λN > 0, ignoring the dependence of the equilibrium value of λN on ζ (thus 
showing that the inequalities hold for arbitrary λN ∈ (0, 1)). From (33), for i = N ,
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[
ζ + (1 − V1)−1
][
1 − V1 + (λ	Rλ)−1φ21
]
= ζ
[
1 − V1 + (λ	Rλ)−1φ21
]
+ 1 + (1 − V1)−1(λ	Rλ)−1φ21
= 1 + ζL−1
[
(1 − ρ)D + φ21
]
+ (1 − ρ)−1D−1φ21 ,
where L := λ	Rλ. Therefore (primes denote derivatives with respect to λN ):
e2rci · ∂U
I
i
∂λN
= ζL−2[(1 − ρ)(LD′ − L′D) + (2Lφ′1 − L′φ1)φ1]
+ (1 − ρ)D−2φ1
[
2Dφ′1 − D′φ1
]
. (39)
Note that L and D do not depend on ζ . From (38), φ1 < 0 and
lim
ζ→0φ1 = −
(1 − ρ)(1 − λN)D
D + (N − 1)2[1 + ρ(N − 1)] , (40)
lim
ζ→0φ
′
1 = (1 − ρ) ·
D2 + (N − 1)2[1 + ρ(N − 1)][D − (1 − λN)D′][
D + (N − 1)2[1 + ρ(N − 1)]
]2 , (41)
lim
ζ→∞φ1 = −
(1 − ρ)(1 − λN)λN
λN + N − 1 , (42)
lim
ζ→∞φ
′
1 = (1 − ρ) ·
λ2N + (N − 1)(2λN − 1)
(λN + N − 1)2 . (43)
From (39),
lim
ζ→0
∂U Ii
∂λN
∝ − lim
ζ→0X, and limζ→∞
∂U Ii
∂λN
∝ lim
ζ→∞Y,
where
X = 2Dφ′1 − D′φ1, (44)
Y = (1 − ρ)(LD′ − L′D) + (2Lφ′1 − L′φ1)φ1. (45)
From (40), (41) and (44),
lim
ζ→0X = 2D
[
D + (1 − λN)D′/2
]
+ 2(N − 1)2[1 + ρ(N − 1)]
[
D − (1 − λN)D′/2
]
.
We now show that the two terms in large square brackets are positive (and hence limζ→0 X > 0). 
We have
D + (1 − λN)D′/2 = (N − 2)[1 + ρ(N − 1 + λN)] + (1 + ρ)λN .
This expression is increasing in ρ. It is easy to check that it is equal to zero when evaluated at 
ρ = ρmin = −(1 − N)−1. Hence it must be positive. Moving on to the second term, we have
D − (1 − λN)D′/2 = (N − 2)[1 + ρ(N − 3)] + 3(N − 3)ρλN
+ 2ρλN(1 + λN) + λN(2λN − 1).
This expression is increasing in ρ (this is the first time in the proof that we use the condition that 
N ≥ 3), hence greater than its value at ρmin:
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N − 1 + λN(2λN − 1)
= 2(N − 2)
N − 1 (1 − λN)
2,
which is positive.
It remains to establish that limζ→∞ Y > 0. This involves some tedious but straightforward 
calculations, of which we provide only the salient details. From (42), (43) and (45), we find that 
limζ→∞ Y ∝ f (ρ), where
f (ρ) := [1 + ρ(N − 1)](λN + N − 1)3R	1 λ
+ (1 − ρ)(1 − λN)2(N − 1)(λN + N − 1)R	1 λ
− (1 − ρ)(1 − λN)λNNλ	Rλ.
We consider f as a function defined on R, with exogenously specified λN ∈ (0, 1). We show that 
f ′′ > 0, f ′(ρmin) > 0, and f (ρmin) > 0. It follows that f > 0 over the relevant interval (ρmin, 1). 
Hence limζ→∞ Y > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 8.1. Proposition 6.9 assures us that a λN -equilibrium exists: we can fix 
λi = 1, for i = N , and focus solely on the determination of λN . From Lemma 6.8 (part (ii)), 
VN(λN) is minimized at λ∗; λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) since ρ ∈ (ρmin, 0). There is an equilibrium with λN ∈
(λ∗, 1]; indeed, there is a unique equilibrium in this interval (see Fig. 1b for the case of N = 3). 
There is a second equilibrium, with λN = 0, if
αN < α
∗
N := VN(0) =
ρ2(N − 1)
1 + ρ(N − 2) .
The cutoff value c∗N corresponds to α∗N , using (14).20
At the equilibrium with positive λN , we have VN ≤ αN < VN(0), i.e. price informativeness 
is strictly lower for type N . From Lemma 6.8 (part (i)), this is the case for the other types as 
well. 
Proof of Proposition 8.2. We consider a situation in which m types are informed and the re-
maining (N − m) types are uninformed. By symmetry, all informed types have the same price 
informativeness, which we denote by V(1). All uninformed types also have the same price infor-
mativeness, V(0). From (22):
V(1) = 1 + ρ(m − 1)
m
, and V(0) = ρ
2m
1 + ρ(m − 1) . (46)
This is an equilibrium provided V(0) > α1 ≥ α2 ≥ . . . ≥ αN > V(1), by Lemma 6.4. Thus we 
require V(0) > V(1). Using (46), and noting that 1 + ρ(m − 1) > 0 due to the fact that ρ > ρmin, 
we get the following condition
ρmin = − 1
N − 1 < ρ < −
1
2m − 1 .
20 This value of c∗
N
is the same as that of c∗∗∗ in Proposition 6.9, for the case where ρ ≥ 0. In the present result, 
however, we have ρ < 0.
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condition ρ < −N−1 ensures that ρ < −(2m − 1)−1 for all such values of m. The open subset 
of cost parameters (ci)Ni=1 for which the proposition holds corresponds to the possible choices of 
(αi)
N
i=1, with αi ∈ (V(1), V(0)). The same choice must apply for all m ≥ (N + 1)/2. Since V(1) is 
decreasing in m and V(0) is increasing in m, the appropriate interval is the one for m = (N +1)/2.
Now let us compare an equilibrium with m = N to one in which m < N . Since V(1) is strictly 
decreasing in m, price informativeness for the types who remain informed is higher for m < N
than at m = N . For any type i that switches from being informed to being uninformed, price 
informativeness must go up, since Vi < αi in the first case and Vi > αi in the second. 
Appendix B. Example 4.4
Here we provide a complete analysis of Example 4.4. We will need the following result, which 
is a special case of Theorem 3.2a.1 in Mathai and Provost (1992):
Lemma B.1. Suppose A is a symmetric n × n matrix, b is an n-vector, c is a scalar, and x is an 
n-dimensional normal random variable: x ∼ N(μ, ),  positive definite. Then E[exp(x	Ax +
b	x + c)] is well-defined if and only if |I − 2A| > 0, and is given by
∣∣I − 2A∣∣− 12 exp[1
2
(μ +b)	 (I − 2A)−1−1 (μ +b) − 1
2
μ	−1μ + c
]
.
We assume that 1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi > 0, which ensures that |I − 2A| > 0 in all the cases where we 
apply Lemma B.1 below.
Since Win is normally distributed conditional on (yi, p), we have
E
[− exp(−riWin)|yi,p]= − exp(−riEin), (47)
where
Ein := E(Win|yi,p) − ri2 Var(Win|yi,p)
= − ri
2
σ 2v q
2
in − (p + riσvei yi)qin −
ri
2
σ 2ei y
2
i . (48)
If agent in is informed he chooses qin to maximize (47), or equivalently (48). We obtain:
qIin =
−riσvei yi − p
riσ 2v
. (49)
If agent in is uninformed, he maximizes
E[− exp(−riWin)|p] = E
[
E[− exp(−riWin)|yi,p]
∣∣p]
= −E [exp (−riEin) |p] .
From (48).
−riEin = r
2
i
2
σ 2ei y
2
i + r2i σvei qinyi +
r2i
2
σ 2v q
2
in + ripqin,
which is of the form Ay2 + byi + c, wherei
590 R. Rahi, J.-P. Zigrand / Journal of Economic Theory 177 (2018) 558–593A = r
2
i
2
σ 2ei , b = r2i σvei qin, c =
r2i
2
σ 2v q
2
in + ripqin.
Hence we can apply Lemma B.1 to the agent’s objective function, with
μ = E(yi |p) = σyip
σ 2p
p,  = σ 2yi |p = σ 2yi −
σ 2yip
σ 2p
,
to obtain
E
[− exp(−riWin)|p]= −(1 − 2A)− 12
· exp
[
(1 − 2A)−1
(
Aμ2 + bμ + 1
2
b2 + (1 − 2A)c
)]
= −
(
1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p
)− 12
exp
[(
1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p
)−1
H
]
, (50)
where
H := r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yip
2σ 4p
p2 + r
2
i σvei σyip
σ 2p
pqin + r
4
i
2
σ 2vei σ
2
yi |pq
2
in
+ (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)
[
r2i
2
σ 2v q
2
in + ripqin
]
= r
2
i
2
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
]
q2in + ri
[
riσvei σyip
σ 2p
+ (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)
]
pqin
+ r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yip
2σ 4p
p2. (51)
The agent’s portfolio choice problem boils down to minimizing H . The first-order condition is
r2i
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1− r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
]
qin + ri
[
riσvei σyip
σ 2p
+ (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)
]
p = 0, (52)
which gives us
qUin = −
riσvei σyip
σ 2p
+ (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)
ri
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
]p. (53)
Using the market-clearing condition 
∑
i[λiqIin + (1 − λi)qUin] = 0, we see that the price func-
tion takes the form p = k∑i λiθi . The constant k is well-defined and nonzero, from the same 
argument as in the proof of Proposition 3.2.
We now calculate ex ante expected utilities. Consider first the informed agent. Using (48) and 
(49),
Ein = ri2
(
σ 2v q
2
in − σ 2ei y2i
)
= 1
2riσ 2v
[−r2i (σ 2v σ 2ei − σ 2vei )y2i + p2 + 2riσvei yip].
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A = 1
2σ 2v
[
r2i (σ
2
v σ
2
ei
− σ 2vei ) −riσvei−riσvei −1
]
.
Using Lemma B.1 (and noting that E(x) = 0),
−ericiE[exp(−riWin)] = −ericiE[exp(−riEin)]
= −erici |I − 2A|− 12 .
Calculating the determinant, we get
|I − 2A| = (σ 2v )−1
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi )σ 2v + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2p + 2riσvei σyip
]
.
Using the definition of Uin given by (11), we have
U Iin = e−2rici |I − 2A|
= e
−2rici
σ 2v
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi )σ 2v + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2p + 2riσvei σyip
]
. (54)
Next, consider the uninformed agent. From (51)–(53),
H = r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yip
2σ 4p
p2 − r
2
i
2
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
]
q2in
= r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yip
2σ 4p
p2 −
[
riσvei σyip
σ 2p
+ (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)
]2
2
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
]p2
= − 1
2σ 2p
hp2, (55)
where
h := − r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yip
σ 2p
+
σ 2p
[
riσvei σyip
σ 2p
+ (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)
]2
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
= 1
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
[
− r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yip
σ 2p
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
]
+ r
2
i σ
2
vei
σ 2yip
σ 2p
+ (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)2σ 2p + 2riσvei σyip(1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)
]
= 1 − r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yi |p
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
·
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yip
σ 2p
− r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yip
σ 2p
σ 2v + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2p + 2riσvei σyip
]
.
Using Lemma B.1 to evaluate the expected value of (50), and substituting the expression for H
given by (55), we get
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[− exp(−riWin]= E(E[− exp(−riWin)|p])
= −(1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)−
1
2 E
(
exp
[
−(2σ 2p)−1(1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)−1hp2
])
= −(1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)−
1
2
[
1 + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)−1h
]− 12
= −
[
(1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p) + h
]− 12
.
Hence,
UUin = (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p) + h
= 1 − r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yi |p
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
+ r
2
i σ
2
vei
σ 2yip
σ 2p
− r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yip
σ 2p
σ 2v + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2p + 2riσvei σyip
]
= 1 − r
2
i σ
2
ei
σ 2yi |p
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2v
·
[
r2i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi )σ 2v + (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)σ 2p + 2riσvei σyip
]
. (56)
From (54) and (56), we can calculate the utility ratio:
U Ii
UUi
= e−2rici
[
1 + r
2
i σ
2
vei
σ 2yi |p
σ 2v (1 − r2i σ 2ei σ 2yi |p)
]
= e−2rici
[
1 + 1
σ 2v (r
2
i σ
2
θi |p)
−1 − (ρ2vei )−1
]
= e−2rici
⎡
⎣1 + 1
σ 2v
[
r2i σ
2
θi
(1 − Vi )
]−1 − (ρ2vei )−1
⎤
⎦ , (57)
where ρvei := corr(v, ei).
References
Allen, F., 1984. The Social Value of Asymmetric Information. Working Paper. University of Pennsylvania.
Banerjee, S., Green, B., 2015. Signal or noise? Uncertainty and learning about whether other traders are informed. 
J. Financ. Econ. 117 (2), 398–423.
Barlevy, G., Veronesi, P., 2008. Information Acquisition in Financial Markets: A Correction. Working Paper. University 
of Chicago.
Breon-Drish, B., 2012. Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: Anything Goes. Working Paper. Stanford Univer-
sity.
Ganguli, J., Yang, L., 2009. Complementarities, multiplicity, and supply information. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 7, 90–115.
García, D., Strobl, G., 2011. Relative wealth concerns and complementarities in information acquisition. Rev. Financ. 
Stud. 24, 169–207.
Goldstein, I., Li, Y., Yang, L., 2014. Speculation and hedging in segmented markets. Rev. Financ. Stud. 27 (3), 881–922.
Goldstein, I., Yang, L., 2015. Information diversity and complementarities in trading and information acquisition. J. Fi-
nance 70 (4), 1723–1765.
R. Rahi, J.-P. Zigrand / Journal of Economic Theory 177 (2018) 558–593 593Gottardi, P., Rahi, R., 2014. Value of information in competitive economies with incomplete markets. Int. Econ. Rev. 55, 
57–81.
Grossman, S., Stiglitz, J., 1980. On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. Am. Econ. Rev. 70, 393–408.
Hellwig, M., 1980. On the aggregation of information in competitive markets. J. Econ. Theory 22, 477–498.
Hirshleifer, J., 1971. The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity. Am. Econ. Rev. 61, 
561–574.
Kurlat, P., Veldkamp, L., 2015. Should we regulate financial information? J. Econ. Theory 158, 697–720.
Manzano, C., Vives, X., 2011. Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, 
and equilibrium multiplicity. J. Math. Econ. 47, 346–369.
Mathai, A.M., Provost, S.B., 1992. Quadratic Forms in Random Variables: Theory and Applications. Marcel Dekker, 
New York.
Mele, A., Sangiorgi, F., 2015. Uncertainty, information acquisition and price swings in asset markets. Rev. Econ. Stud. 82, 
1533–1567.
Mendel, B., Shleifer, A., 2012. Chasing noise. J. Financ. Econ. 104, 303–320.
Peress, J., 2014. Learning from stock prices and economic growth. Rev. Financ. Stud. 27 (10), 2998–3059.
Rahi, R., 1996. Adverse selection and security design. Rev. Econ. Stud. 63, 287–300.
Rostek, M., Weretka, M., 2012. Price inference in small markets. Econometrica 80 (2), 687–711.
Rostek, M., Weretka, M., 2015. Information and strategic behavior. J. Econ. Theory 158, 536–557.
Stein, J.C., 1987. Informational externalities and welfare-reducing speculation. J. Polit. Econ. 95 (6), 1123–1145.
Veldkamp, L.L., 2006a. Information markets and the comovement of asset prices. Rev. Econ. Stud. 73, 823–845.
Veldkamp, L.L., 2006b. Media frenzies in markets for financial information. Am. Econ. Rev. 96 (3), 577–601.
Vives, X., 2008. Information and Learning in Markets. Princeton University Press.
Vives, X., 2014. On the possibility of informationally efficient markets. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 12 (5), 1200–1239.
